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Abstract 
 
Does the labeling of products which have been produced without any child laborers 
contribute to increased welfare of children? This paper presents some results of a survey in 
Nepal conducted to analyze which factors determine the probability of a child to work, and to 
examine the influence of non governmental organizations (NGOs) which are engaged in social 
labeling, on the incidence of child labor and child schooling. Data were obtained from interviews 
with 410 households of Kathmandu Valley in Nepal. The results of the econometric analysis 
show that the probability of child labor (i) decreases if the carpet industry has implemented a 
labeling program, (ii) decreases if the adult’s income increases (‘luxury axiom’), (iii) decreases if 
the head of the household is educated, (iv) increases with the age of the head of the household, 
and (v) is increased in the presence of more children (aged 5-14) in the household. It can also be 
shown that labeling NGOs have a significant positive influence on sending the ex-child laborers 
to school.  
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Kurzfassung 
 
Erhöht die Kennzeichnung von Produkten, die ohne Kinderarbeit hergestellt werden, die 
Wohlfahrt von Kindern? Dieses Papier präsentiert Ergebnisse einer Befragung in Nepal, die 
durchgeführt wurde, um zu analysieren, welche Faktoren die Wahrscheinlichkeit bestimmen, 
dass ein Kind arbeitet. Darüber hinaus wird untersucht, welchen Einfluss Nichtregierungs-
organisationen (NROs), die sich mit der Zertifizierung von Produkten nach sozialen Kriterien 
beschäftigen, auf das Vorkommen von Kinderarbeit bzw. auf die Schulausbildung haben. Dazu 
wurden 410 Haushalte im Kathmandu Valley in Nepal befragt. Es zeigt sich, dass die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit von Kinderarbeit (i) sinkt, wenn die Teppichindustrie ein soziales Kennzeich-
nungsprogramm implementiert hat, (ii) sinkt, wenn das Einkommen der Erwachsenen steigt 
("Luxus-Axiom"), (iii) sinkt, wenn der Haushaltsvorstand über Bildung verfügt, (iv) zunimmt 
mit dem Alter des Haushaltsvorstandes und (v) zunimmt mit der Anzahl der Kinder (im Alter 
von 5-14) in einem Haushalt. Zudem kann gezeigt werden, dass NROs, die soziale Kennzeich-
nungsprogramme implementieren, einen signifikant positiven Einfluss auf die Schuleinweisung 
von ehemaligen Kinderarbeitern haben. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the process of globalization, the labor-intensive industries in South Asian Countries do 
not only earn a large share of foreign exchange, but also provide a significant share of 
employment by emphasizing export-led growth. In addition, the growth and expansion of these 
industries is determined by intra and inter industry competition to gain better comparative 
advantage across the South Asian Countries. This process contributes to an increased demand for 
child labor because of intensified competition over wage costs to gain comparative advantage. 
Children are generally fast and quick learners, they do not have any labor union for support, and 
they are very cheap laborers. Therefore, some industries prefer using children to improve their 
comparative advantage, so that these export-led industries are responsible for generating huge 
employment for child laborers, which certainly raises strong concern for future growth and 
development. 
 
In recent years, the discussion about the impact of globalization on the incidence of child 
labor has evoked a controversial debate in the literature. Neumayer and de Soysa (2004) argue 
that countries being more open towards free trade and/or having a higher stock of foreign direct 
investment also have a lower incidence of child labor. They conclude that globalization is 
associated with less, not more, child labor. Maskus (1997), however, considers globalization as 
an expanded opportunity to engage in international trade so that a larger export sector will raise 
the demand for child labor inputs. According to Brown (2002), the rise in the demand for child 
labor will be accompanied by a rise in the child’s wage. This change lowers the return to 
education and raises the opportunity cost of education, thereby stimulating child labor. On the 
other hand, Basu and Van (1998) and Basu (2002) argue that any positive income effects that 
accompany free trade openness will help families by meeting or even exceeding the critical 
adult-wage level at which child labor begins to decline. Contrary to this argument, Edmonds 
(2002) postulates that increased earning opportunities for parents may change the types of work 
performed by parents. As a result, children may be forced to take over some of the activities 
usually performed by adults within their household. 
 
It might not seem to be worth to debate whether changes in local labor markets caused by 
globalization increase or decrease child labor because no developing country can afford not to 
participate and/or accept the opportunity of receiving foreign investment by trade creation and 
trade diversion. However, it might be well argued that the globalization process has been playing 
a major role in pushing the issue of fair and ethical trade as a priority issue in the international 
trade debate. That is why the above intellectual debate is very important to address the child 
labor problem in the international trade literature, especially after the nineties when consumers 
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have learned from the media that a number of the products they purchase could have been 
produced by child laborers. 
 
Therefore, strong concern throughout the importing countries about the social status of 
the commodity as well as questions of ethical trade in the globalization process have been raised. 
India’s profits from exporting hand-woven carpets increased from US$ 65 million to US$ 229 
million between 1979 and 1983. Due to consumer boycotts that figure dropped to US$ 150 
million in 1993, indicating the power consumers have to putting an end to child labor by not 
buying carpets made by children (Charlé 2001). Activists have been quick in blaming trade 
liberalization for the negative effects on local labor markets, and have suggested trade sanctions 
as tools to coerce policy changes aimed at mitigating child labor (Edmonds, 2004). Trade 
intervention may take the form of either the threat of or the immediate imposition of trade 
sanctions. 
 
Strong support to the idea of using trade interventions for abolishing child labor arose 
from the Harkin’s Bill, also called the US Child Labor Deterrence Act from 1993. This bill 
proposed to partially or fully ban the import of goods produced by child laborers. It was based on 
concerns raised by Senator Harkin about the lack of child protection and the need to ensure mass 
education (UNICEF, 2003). The immediate influence of the bill, which eventually never became 
law, was dramatic in the case of Bangladesh.  Fearing a trade sanction and a loss in market share, 
all child laborers were fired from the export sector  in Bangladesh. An estimated 50,000 children 
lost their jobs (UNICEF, 2003), and nearly 1.5 million families were affected (CUTS, 2003). 
According to UNICEF (2003), 77 percent of the children retrenched from the garment industries 
were adversely affected in Bangladesh. A majority of the children were pushed into the informal 
sector, which offers more hazardous and lower paid jobs. 
 
Trade sanctions, thus, might have severe consequences. Some authors doubt the ability of 
trade sanctions to eliminate child labor (Bhagwati, 1995; Maskus, 1997). Theoretical models by 
Maskus (1997) and Melchior (1996) show that trade sanctions or import tariffs against countries 
where the use of child labor is prevalent do not necessarily reduce the incidence of child labor. 
On the contrary, the multinational company insisting that its subcontractors fire all child laborers 
may be doing those children more harm than good (Freeman, 1994). After being displaced from 
the export sector, these children may find themselves worse-off if no viable alternative like 
education or better working conditions in other sectors exists (Hemmer, 1996). In many 
developing countries, children may also have to work for the economic survival of the family 
(Grote, Basu and Weinhold, 1998). 
 
As a result, several measures and initiatives like ‘Social Labeling’ or Codes of Conduct 
are directed towards ending the use of child labor. They are increasingly suggested in the context 
of ethical trade and implemented as an alternative tool to trade sanctions. Social labeling for 
example acts as a signal in the market informing consumers about the social conditions of 
production, and assuring them that the item or service they purchase is produced under equitable 
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working conditions (Hilowitz, 1997). It is praised as a market-based and voluntary, and therefore 
more attractive instrument to raise labor standards (Basu, Chau and Grote, 2000). 
 
Many labeling programs have been developed, especially by non governmental 
organizations (NGOs) like Rugmark, Care & Fair, STEP or Kaleen. Some characteristics of 
these programs for Nepal and also India are highlighted in Table 1.1. To make sure that these 
labels remain credible, regular monitoring of the programs is conducted. Generally, if after one 
or two inspections, children are found working, the licensee is decertified and no longer 
permitted to use the NGO’s label. Nevertheless, labeling programs have been criticized on the 
grounds of the credibility of the claims made on their labels. Some organizations believe that 
credible monitoring is simply an impossible task. For example, the Secretary General of Care & 
Fair stated that there are "…280,000 looms in India spread over 100,000 square kilometers…" 
(U.S. Department of Labour, 1997, p. 46.). Thus, it is argued that credible monitoring of such a 
large number of geographically dispersed looms is simply not feasible. 
 
Table 1.1 : Overview of Labeling Initiatives (Nepal and India) 
 
 RUGMARK Kaleen STEP Care & Fair 
Number of Exporters     
India 215 256 22 138 
Nepal 149 N/A 8 72 
Monitoring     
Self Yes No No No 
Hired external agency No Yes Yes No 
Rehabilitation and 
welfare measures 
    
schools Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rehabilitation center Yes No No No 
medical facilities Mobile Yes Mobile Hospitals, 
dispensary, 
and clinics 
adult education Yes No No No 
women carpet weaving 
training center 
No No Yes No 
Certification     
Individual carpets Yes Yes No No 
Company   Yes Yes 
Source of financing     
% of FOB contribution 
by exporters 
0.25 %   0.25 % 
External funding Yes Yes (ministry) Yes  
Source: Sharma (2002); TEP Foundation, U. S. Department of Labor (1997) 
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Only legislation, however sincere it might be in purpose, is unlikely to solve the problem. 
Since the nature of the problem is rather economic than legal, the labeling NGOs provide 
schools, health care facilities and hospitals for the displaced child laborers. In addition, various 
supporting programs like school tuition exemption, books, uniforms, and even food are offered 
by the labeling NGOs to former child laborers. Thus, they aim at compensating some 
opportunity cost of child schooling. 
 
Labeling NGOs also often place priority to community-based rehabilitation. 
Consequently every effort is made to reunite the children with their families, so that they do not 
become alienated from their communities. Children who return to their families are given for 
example four levels of support depending upon their need, like support for school fees, books, 
uniforms and other materials. Children over 14 years are encouraged to join vocational training 
programs, which are also financed by labeling NGOs. An emphasis is also put on physical 
fitness, and extra-curricular pursuits such as music and art for the children. 
 
Labeling as a strategy for reducing child labor has received analytical support from 
Freeman (1994) and Basu et al. (2000), but empirical evidence on this topic is still scarce. 
Moreover, several recent studies have highlighted the fact that Nepal lacks basic data needed for 
monitoring employment and labor market conditions1. Therefore, this study is an attempt to 
collect and analyze primary data from Nepali carpet industries. It will focus on the two labeling 
programs Rugmark and Care & Fair which have been in operation now for 10 years in Nepal. 
The Rugmark Foundation, established by “Brot fur die Welt”, “Misereor”, “terre des hommes” 
and UNICEF in 1995, aims at eliminating the employment of children in the carpet industry by 
assigning the Rugmark-label to carpets made without child labor. A fund has been set up which 
is financed by contributions of the exporting companies. This fund is intended to support the 
establishment of schools and training institutions in those regions where many children were 
employed prior to the campaign (Hemmer, 1996). Care & Fair is an association established by 
the German federation of carpet importers. The label does not promise child labor-free products, 
and monitoring is therefore not needed. It rather supports rehabilitation and education programs 
for children, financed by the imposition of an export charge levied on all carpet imports of 
member companies to Germany from India, Nepal and Pakistan (Hemmer, 1996). 
 
Not clear is whether the children go to school after they were dismissed from the 
exporting carpet industries. If they do not go to school and are employed in more hazardous jobs, 
then labeling obviously decreased their initial welfare. Therefore, empirical evidence from Nepal 
regarding the impact of social labeling on schooling will provide insights about whether social 
labeling can be used as an effective tool to reduce child labor as well as poverty. The results of 
this study will also contribute to a better understanding of whether the marketing signals carried 
by the logos of labeling NGOs are reliable or credible in terms of reducing child labor supply.
                                                 
1 See for instance the report: International Labour Organization Nepal Labour Statistics: Review and Recommen-
dations – A report prepared by an ILO mission, 1-10 July 1996, Kathmandu. 
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2 Child Labor and Child Schooling in Nepal  
 
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per capita of US$ 220, and 
with over half of the population living on less than one dollar a day. The adult illiteracy rate is 60 
percent, and the average household size in Nepal is 5.1 being slightly higher in rural (5.1) than in 
urban areas (4.8). According to the report on the Nepal Labor Force Survey (NLFS) 1998-99, 
there are an estimated 3.7 million households in Nepal with a total population of about 19.1 
million. The estimated number of Nepalese children under the age of 15 amounts to 7.9 million. 
Child labor is a widespread problem in Nepal, and can be found with respect to many economic 
activities. About 500,000 children aged 5 to 9, and 1.5 million children aged 10 to 14 are 
classified as economically active.  This means that their labor force participation rate is 21 
percent, and 61 percent respectively (NLFS, 1998-99). 
 
There are some provisions regarding children in the Nepal Labor Act 2048 (1991).  
According to the Act, a ‘child’ is defined as a person who has not attained the age of 14 years 
(Chapter 1, para. 2). The Act also establishes that “no child shall be engaged in work of any 
enterprise” (Chapter 2, para. 5). In addition, Nepal ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention 
1382 in 1997, and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 182 in 2002. 
 
The national child labour and Nepal labour force surveys indicated that children who do 
not attend school have a 50% higher work participation rate. In rural areas only 36% of working 
children are illiterate, while this rise to 54% in urban areas. Studies also indicate that labor 
participation rates decreases with the level of education of the household head. Girls are more 
likely than boys to work by about 14.4 percent percentage points, and to neither attend school 
nor work by about 10 percent. As a consequence, girls’ probability of attending school is around 
25 percentage points lower than that for boys (UCW, 2003). Data indicates that the economic 
participation rates of children have dropped substantially over time (e.g. from 51% in 1971 to 
29% in 2001 for children ten to fourteen years) due mainly to school enrolment. The larger rate 
drop for boys (59% to 27%), compared to girls (40% to 30%), can be explained by a male bias in 
school enrolment (Gilligan, 2003). 
 
Table 2.1 shows the number of children attending school, and demonstrates how the rates 
of economic activity for children are affected by whether or not children are at school. It also 
                                                 
2 International Labor Organization, Convention concerning minimum age for admission to employment (Convention 
No. 138), Geneva 1976. See also Ministry of Labor, Main provisions of the constitution of ILO and collection of 
some of ILO conventions ratified by His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, HMG, Nepal, 1997. 
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demonstrates how the work participation rates rise as children get older.  At the age of 14, for 
instance, 68 percent of boys and 80 of girls are currently economically active.  
 
 
Table 2.1 : Rates of School Attendance and Labor Force Participation of Children Aged 5 to 9, 
and 10 to 14, by Gender and Locality (in 1000) 
 
 Total  Urban Rural 
 Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Age group 
Number of children attending school 
5-9 1653 919 735 225 122 103 1428 796 632 
10-14 1800 1056 744 247 133 114 1554 923 630 
Total 1454 1975 1479 472 255 217 2,982 1720 1262 
Percentage of children currently at school 
5-9 67.8 74.5 61.0 86.1 89.2 82.7 65.6 72.7 58.5 
10-14 74.3 84.7 63.3 88.6 91.7 85.2 72.4 83.7 60.5 
Total 71.1 79.6 62.1 87.4 90.5 84.0 69.0 78.2 59.5 
Percent of those at school who are currently active in labor 
5-9 19.1 17.9 20.7 6.5 6.1 6.9 21.1 19.7 22.9 
10-14 52.6 50.2 56.1 24.3 23.3 25.5 57.1 54.0 61.6 
Total 36.6 35.2 38.5 15.8 15.1 16.7 39.9 38.1 42.2 
Percent of those not at school who are currently active in labor 
5-9 24.7 19.5 28.3 12.7 9.0 15.2 25.3 20.0 28.9 
10-14 85.0 82.7 86.0 74.3 74.3 74.3 85.6 83.3 86.6 
Total 51.4 43.4 55.9 41.4 38.2 43.5 51.9 43.7 56.5 
 
Source: NLFS 1998/99 
 
 
About 68 percent of the children aged 5 to 9, and 74 percent of children aged 10 to 14, 
currently attend school.  The rate of school attendance for those aged 5 to 14 is much higher in 
urban areas (87 percent) than in rural areas (69 percent).  The contrast in the attendance rates for 
boys and girls is particularly marked in rural areas, with 78 percent of boys, but only 60 percent 
of girls, in this age group attending school.  As we would expect, labor activity rates are higher 
amongst those not attending school than amongst those attending.  But even among children 
currently attending school, as many as 40 percent are recorded as currently active in labor, 
because they did at least one hour of ‘work’ activities in the past seven days. 
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Table 2.2 : The Occurrence of Child Labor in Nepal, by Hours Worked, Occupation, Sector, and 
Gender (in 1000) 
 
 Whether currently attending school 
 Total Yes No 
 Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
 
Total number aged 5-14  4860 2480 2380 3454 1975 1479 406 05 01
 
Number employed  1982 911 1072 1263 694 569 719 216 503
Total hours worked per week 
(million hours) 
44 20 24 23 13 10 22 7 14
Average hours per week per 
person  
22.4 22.1 22.7 18.1 18.5 17.5 30.1 33.8 28.5
 
Occupations 1982 911 1072 1263 694 569 719 216 503
 
Service workers 39 23 17 33 19 14 6 4 2
 Housekeeping & restaurants 13 7 6 9 4 5 3 3 1
Shop salespersons 26 15 11 23 14 9 3 1 2
Agricultural producers 1686 788 899 1084 617 467 602 170 432
Animal producers (market) 53 23 30 39 18 21 14 5 9
Subsistence agriculture 1617 761 856 1037 597 440 581 164 417
Craft and related trades 22 9 13 8 3 5 14 6 8
Plant and machine operators 4 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 0
Elementary occupations 231 90 142 135 54 82 96 36 60
Agricultural labourers 39 17 23 8 3 5 31 14 17
 Fetching water 78 28 50 70 27 43 8 1 7
Collecting firewood 78 25 53 44 19 25 34 6 27
 
Industries 1982 911 1072 1263 694 569 719 216 503
 
Agriculture, hunting & forestry 
 
1725 804 921 1094 620 474
 
631 
 
184 448
Manufacturing 26 11 16 12 4 8 14 6 8
Construction 10 7 3 3 1 2 7 6 1
Wholesale & retail trade 29 17 12 24 15 9 5 2 3
Hotels & restaurants 16 9 7 11 4 7 5 4 1
Private with employed persons 165 58 107 114 47 68 51 11 40
All other categories 10 5 5 4 2 2 6 3 2
Source: NLFS 1998/99 
 
 
Table 2.2 highlights the kind and amount of work that children do.  Two million children 
aged 5 to 14 who are classified as currently employed work a total of 44 million hours per week, 
representing 22 hours a week on average for every child who is currently employed.  Boys and 
girls do about the same amount of work (22.1 and 22.7 hours respectively). Most (76 percent) of 
the boys who work are also still attending school, implying that they are continuing with their 
schooling. Girls who work are less likely to continue with their schooling, with only 53 percent 
of employed girls still attending school. 
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The Nepali carpet industry is the largest employer and foreign exchange earner in the 
country. Carpet production in Nepal is concentrated in and around the Kathmandu Valley. 
Nepal’s carpet sector experienced its first export boom in 1976. The volume of exports more 
than doubled within one year, increasing from close to 20,000 square meters in 1975 to 47,500 
square meters in 1976 (KC, 2003). By 1991, this sector contributed to more than 50 percent of 
the nation’s total exports (Shrestha, 1991). The year 1993-94 recorded the highest ever volume 
of carpet exports, with more than 330,000 square meters amounting to a value of US$ 190 
million. By destination of Nepalese carpets, the European market accounts for the biggest share 
of total export absorption. 
 
After 1994, however, it became internationally well known that the carpet industry 
intensively employs child laborers - for long hours in any given day.  The children work as wool 
spinners and weavers, and some also dye and wash carpets (CUTS, 2003). In a study by the 
Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre (CWIN, 1993) from the early nineties, 365 carpet 
factories within the Kathmandu Valley were surveyed, and it was estimated that about 50 percent 
of the total 300,000 laborers were children. Of them, almost 8 percent were below 10 years old, 
65 percent between 11 and 14, and the remaining 27 percent were between 15 and 16 years 
(CWIN, 1993). A recent study by ILO (2002) estimated that about 7,700 or 12 percent of the 
total 64,300 laborers were child laborers in the carpet industries of the Kathmandu Valley. 
According to a survey of 17 carpet factories by the Nepal office of the Asian-American Free 
Labor Institute (AAFLI), 30 percent of the workers were found to be less than 14 years of age 
(CUTS, 2003). 
 
However, after hearing about the use of child laborers in the Nepalese carpet sector, 
consumers in the German market refrained from buying Nepalese carpets (KC, 2002). Therefore, 
from 1995 onwards the carpet sector in Nepal experienced a declining trend in terms of 
production volume and export earnings. Until the mid nineties, Germany was buying over 80 
percent of Nepali Carpets (Graner, 1999) but it then decreased to 64% of the total carpet export 
from Nepal to Germany (Bajracharya, 2004). The decline in the demand for Nepali carpets 
motivated the government, manufacturers and exporters to participate in the child labor-free 
labeling schemes. Subsequently, a number of social labeling initiatives in Nepal such as 
Rugmark and Care & Fair were introduced. The label became a legally binding international 
trademark in Germany in December 1995, and in 1996 in the US; these are the largest markets 
for carpet exports from South Asia (CUTS, 2003). Currently, almost 70% of the Nepalese carpet 
industry is licensed by the Rugmark certification system.  
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3 Data Collection and Method of Analysis 
 
The main objective of this paper is to identify the effect of social labeling NGOs on the 
child labor supply decision in Nepal. This study takes into account the determinants of child 
labor used in various theories mentioned above and considers the influence of social labeling 
NGOs as a new determinant of the child labor decision by households. In accordance with the 
ILO convention 138, this study defines children from 5 to 14 years of age who were working in 
the last two months when this survey was conducted, as ‘child laborers’, no matter whether the 
children were working full or part time.  
 
3.1. Survey in Nepal  
 
The data collection in the Kathmandu valley in Nepal was based on primary and some 
secondary information of households working in the carpet industry. In order to decrease the 
variances and therefore increase the efficiency of the tests and precision of the estimations, the 
population was stratified with respect to sources of disturbing heterogeneity. The main suspected 
sources of heterogeneity were: 
 
a) Administrative differences of regions.  
b) Important time points3. 
 
This study stratifies the population and sample data by equi-proportional sizes with 
respect to the level of these variables and then draws a simple random sample from each stratum 
(Levy and Lemeshow, 1999). After stratification, the field workers visited carpet industries from 
the lists of Rugmark and Care & Fair to locate the labeled carpet industries, and visited the non 
labeled carpet industries from the same area as well. 
 
The major challenge of this study was to locate the stratified households and getting a 
large enough random sample, so that a reasonable degree of confidence could be reached for 
statistically significant results. Appendix 1A, 1B, 1D shows sample sizes of different 
administrative regions at Kathmandu Valley. 
 
There was no base line survey after 1993 that lists the children who lost their job from the 
carpet industries by the social labeling initiatives but there was a list of the children who were 
educated in the labeling NGOs’ schools in different parts of the Kathmandu Valley. The other 
                                                 
3 The NGOs came into operation in 1995. Therefore this sampling has to consider whether a present member of a 
household was a child before 1995 or after 1995. The results shown here consider the second group.   
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three available lists contain the addresses of the carpet industries provided by Central Carpet 
Industries Association (CCIA), Rugmark and Care & Fair. 
 
In selecting the sample of carpet industries, the status of its registration by the labeling 
NGOs was taken into account. So, the sample was stratified by labeling households and non 
labeling households (see Appendix 1C & 1D). A labeling household is defined as a household 
with at least one person working in industries registered by labeling NGOs, and no member 
working in any non labeling industry. A non labeling household is a household with at least one 
person working in the unregistered carpet industry and nobody of the household working in the 
registered industry. 
 
To compare the situation of labeling and non labeling households, the surveyed 
households were split into two parts; approximately half of them were selected from labeling and 
half of them from non labeling households. Appendix 1C shows that the quantitative study 
covered a total of 1,971 persons in 410 households. 56 percent of the households were involved 
with labeling NGOs and 44 percent were not involved with labeling NGOs. 
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3.2. Econometric Method 
 
Logistic regression is the most appropriate statistical method to assess the influence of the 
independent variables on a dichotomous or polytomous dependent variable. A list and 
description of the dependent and independent variables is to be found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
Table 3.1 :  Variables used for statistical calculation at household level 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 If the working time per day is eight hours or above, then  the child laborer works full time. If the working time per 
day is at least two and less than eight hours, then the child laborer works part time.  
 
Variable name (SAS) Variable Description 
Type of the 
Variable 
HH_Id Household Id Key
HH_HoH_Age Age of the Head of Household Continuous
HH_HoH_Sex Gender of the Head of the Household Binary Categorical
HH_HoH_Edu Education of the Head of the Household Categorical
HH_Size 
Actual total permanent members of the 
household 
Continuous
HH_IncGT14 
Last month total income of family 
members older than 14 (adults) 
Continuous
HH_Debts 
Actual total outstanding debts incl. 
interest and costs 
Continuous
HH_N_ChildLE14 Total actual number of children (<=14) Continuous
HH_N_Child0514School 
Total actual number of children in school 
(5-14) at least 20 days 
Continuous
HH_IsAnybodyInLBLInd 
Is anybody of the family working in a 
labeled industry? 
Binary Categorical
HH_IsAbsDolPov Absolute poverty ($) Binary Categorical
HH_IsAnyChildLab 
Has there any child been working in the 
household in the last two months full time 
or part time?4 
Binary Categorical
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Table 3.2 :  Variables used for statistical calculation per child in household 
 
Variable name (SAS) Variable Description 
Type of the 
Variable 
Ind_IsThisChildLab 
Has this child (age 5-14) been working in 
the last two months full time or part time? 
Binary Categorical
Ind_NGOAssistChild Is the child helped by labeling NGO? Binary Categorical
 
We use a binary multiple logistic regression, and define the probability that a child is being 
employed in the following way: 
 
X    
p-1
pln   : (p)logit β′+α=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=    (3.2.0) 
where  
p = Probability ( Child is employed | X ) 
α = Intercept parameter 
ß = Vector of slope parameters  
X = Vector of explanatory variables 
 
The null hypothesis is βi = 0 for all i. We divided the explanatory variables into two sets: 
Variables describing household characteristics and variables describing each individual child of a 
household. That will lead to two approaches: In the first sub-model (3.2.1), we only concentrate 
on household characteristics as explanatory variables (XH) (see Table 3.1) and determine the 
probability that at least one child in a household is employed (see definition above). 
 
  H
H
H
H X    p-1
p
ln   :)(p itlog β′+α=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=    (3.2.1) 
where 
pH = Probability (HH_IsAnyChildLab | XH ) 
 
In the second sub-model (3.2.2), we are interested in the probability of an individual child 
to work. In this case, household and individual characteristics are used as explanatory variables 
(XHC) (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) to determine whether a child was employed in the last two months 
 
   X    
p-1
p
ln   : )(plogit HC
C
C
C β′+α=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=    (3.2.2) 
where 
pC = Probability (Ind_IsThisChildLab | XHC ) 
 
The above econometric approach is to estimate the odds of child labor by using binary 
multiple logistic regression. 
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However, not included in model (3.2.2) is whether and to which extent social labeling 
NGOs activities influence choices of child activities between previous time (at least 2 months 
before June 2004) and at present (June 2004). From all combinations of  previous and present 
children status with respect to school attendance, idle time or paid work, six not ordered, 
mutually exclusive, options where selected: 
 
• previously child labor and now schooling 
• previously idle and now idle 
• previously idle and now working 
• previously schooling and now child labor 
• previously schooling and now schooling 
• previously working and now working. 
 
A multinomial logistic regression with baseline-category logits is performed to test the 
influence of social labeling NGOs activities on these six options 
 
More formally: 
If the dependent variable takes K nominal values then the multinomial logistic regression 
model with baseline-category logit is defined as: 
 
1-K1,..,j     X')
p
p
log( jj
K
j =β+α=    (3.2.3) 
The model consists of  K-1 logit equations, with separate parameter for each j=1,…,K-1. 
For each j=1,…K-1 : 
 )
p
p
log(
K
j   is called baseline-category logit 
pj = Probability ( Child chose option j | X ) 
αj = Intercept parameter 
ßj= Vector of slope parameters 
and 
pK= Probability ( Child chose option K | X ) Baseline option K: ‘previously working and now 
working’ 
X = Vector of explanatory variables 
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4 Discussion of the Model Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
For the households who are working in the carpet industry in Kathmandu Valley this 
survey estimates a mean household size of 4.8 ([4.6 ; 4.9]95% CI). The mean monthly income is 
5,535Rs and the mean per capita income of the household is 1,284Rs ([1,229 ; 1,340 ] 95% CI ). 
According to the Nepal Living Standards Survey Report (1996), the per capita income was 
2,007Rs for Kathmandu and 641Rs for the whole country. The average per capita income in the 
carpet belt of Kathmandu Valley (1,284 Rs) is significantly lower than that of the overall per 
capita income estimated in 1996 for the Kathmandu Valley (2,007 Rs); but the households who 
are working in carpet industries in Kathmandu Valley have a higher per capita income than in 
the whole country estimated in 1996 (641Rs). This immense wage gradient between Kathmandu 
Valley and the rest of the country might induce an intra country migration of child labourers to 
Kathmandu Valley. 
 
The mean of the household’s monthly expenditure is estimated as 4,469Rs. The estimated 
mean consumption expenditure of the household is 83% ([81 ; 85]95% CI of their income, and the 
estimated net savings rate is 12% ([11 ; 14]95% CI as the monthly saving amount to 665Rs, and the 
remaining 4-5 percent of the income is assumed to be spend to repay a household loan. The net 
savings per household in this study are derived from the total income of a household from all 
sources minus the consumption expenditure during the reference period and loan payment. 
Consumption expenditure includes the amount spent by a household on food and non food items. 
 
From survey data we estimate that 91 percent of the household members joined their first 
job already in their childhood. The mean age of first joining a profession is 11 (median and mode 
age is 10). It follows that almost all household members were children when they joined the first 
job. The mean age of starting school is 8 years for children  (CI95% : [7 ; 8]). On average 53 
percent ([46 ; 60] 95% CI ) of the children work up to 8 hours and of them 27 percent ([21 ; 34] 95% 
CI ) work in labeling carpet industries and 26 percent ([20 ; 32] 95% CI ) in non labelled carpet 
industries. 
 
Roughly 29 percent ([23 ; 35] 95% CI ) of the total child laborers work more than 8 hours 
up to a maximum of 14 hours per day in both labeling and non labeling industries. Of them 12 
percent ([7 ; 16] 95% CI ) work in labeling carpet industries and 17 percent ([12 ; 22] 95% CI ) in non 
labeling carpet industries. 
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Almost 18 percent of the child labourers work more than 14 hours per day in both 
labeling and non labeling carpet industries. Of them 6 percent ([3 ; 10] 95% CI ) work in labeled 
industries and 12 percent ([8 ; 17] 95% CI ) work in non labeled carpet industries. 
 
Hence, exploitation in terms of working hours is higher in the non labeling industries 
than in the labeling industries.  
 
 
4.2. Econometric Estimates 
 
The results of testing the influence of variables on the chance of child labor at the 
household level (3.2.1) or the individual level (3.2.2) are shown in Table 2B and 2C respectively: 
 
i) The labeling status of a household is an important factor in decreasing child labor 
participation. 
A comparison of tables 2B and 2C shows that for each family as well as for each 
child, the magnitude of the estimated child labor decreases with labeling NGO 
intervention.  
The estimated odds ratio of the labeling status are 0.4815 for the family-wise 
regression. This means, that the odds of having a child laborer in the family not 
being assisted by an NGO are more than 2 times6 the odds of having a working 
child in an NGO-assisted family. For the child-wise model we get an odds ratio of  
0.117 which means, that the odds for a child from an unassisted family to work 
are more than 8 times7 higher than the odds for a child to work from an NGO-
assisted family. Thus, the null hypothesis of "NGO has no influence" in model 
(3.2.1) and (3.2.2)  is not only clearly rejected but also the NGO factor turns out to 
be the most important factor in preventing child labor. 
                                                 
5 In Table 2B the point estimator of the odds ratio of HH_isAnybodyInLBLInd of registered vs. unregistered is 
0.481 which is defined as: 
)industry edunregister infamily  in all|kingfamily wor  thein childany (
)industry registered infamily  in oneany |kingfamily wor  thein childany (481.0
odds
odds=  
For confidence intervals, please refer to table 2B and 2C in the appendix. 
6 2.08 = 1 / 0.481 
7 8.55 = 1 / 0.117 
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Table 2B :  Logistic regression (3.2.1) results for the probability of child labor (Household 
Level, N = 410) 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate Pr > ChiSq Point 
Estimate 
90%   
Confidence 
Limits 
Intercept  0.7929 0.4239   
HH_IsAnybodyInLBLInd Registered   vs 
Unregistered
-0.3659 0.0106 0.481 0.300 0.770 
HH_IsAbsDolPov No  vs Yes 0.8154 0.1162 5.108 0.926 28.180 
HH_HoH_Sex Female vs Male -0.1479 0.5979 0.744 0.296 1.872 
HH_HoH_Edu At least rimary 
education vs No 
education
-0.3920 0.0175 0.457 0.265 0.786 
HH_IncGT14_SC(*) -0.7768 0.0272 0.460 0.258 0.820 
HH_N_ChildLE14 1.3055 <.0001 3.690 2.455 5.544 
HH_Debts_SC(**) 0.1461 0.0887 1.157 1.005 1.333 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(***) 0.2151 0.0332 1.240 1.050 1.464 
HH_N_Child0514School -1.2665 <.0001 0.282 0.204 0.389 
HH_Size -0.4196 0.0065 0.657 0.510 0.847 
 
(*)  HH_IncGt14_SC is the scaled adult income of the household (in 5,000 rupies) 
(**) HH_Debts_SC is the scaled household's debts (in 5,000 rupies) 
(***) HH_HoH_Age_SC is the scaled head of household's age (in 5 years) 
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Table 2C :  Logistic regression (3.2.2) results for the probability of child labor (Individual 
Level, N = 525) 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 
90%   
Confidence 
Limits 
Intercept 0.5249 0.5520  
Ind_NGOAssistChild Yes  vs No -1.0727 0.0408 0.117 0.021 0.657 
HH_IsAbsDolPov No  vs Yes 0.4191 0.2881 2.312 0.631 8.467 
HH_HoH_Sex Female vs Male 0.0222 0.9103 1.045 0.547 1.998 
HH_HoH_Educ 
At least primary 
education vs No 
education
-0.2510 0.0334 0.605 0.411 0.892 
HH_IncGT14_SC(*) -0.4568 0.0699 0.633 0.418 0.959 
HH_N_ChildLE14 0.2370 0.1082 1.267 0.994 1.616 
HH_Debts_SC(**) 0.0881 0.0502 1.092 1.014 1.176 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(***) 0.0690 0.2482 1.071 0.971 1.182 
HH_N_Child0514School -0.8792 <.0001 0.415 0.343 0.503 
HH_Size -0.2324 0.0309 0.793 0.664 0.946 
 
(*)  HH_IncGt14_SC is the scaled adult income of the household (in 5,000 rupies) 
(**) HH_Debts_SC is the scaled household's debts (in 5,000 rupies) 
(***) HH_HoH_Age_SC is the scaled head of household's age (in 5 years) 
 
ii) Following the luxury axiom8 of Basu and Van (1998), this study tests whether 
there is a relationship between child labor and adult income ('HH_IncGt14_SC' 
scaled adult's income in 5,000 Rupies). It can be concluded that the sign and the 
statistical significance of the estimated adult income coefficient support the Basu 
and Van model. The estimated odds ratio for adult income are 0.460 in the 
household level regression and 0.633 in the individual level regression. This 
means, that for each additional 5,000 Rupies in the family income, the odds for 
                                                 
8 The family will send the children to the labor market only if the family's income from non child labor sources 
drops significantly. 
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child labor are more than halved (46%) by each 5,000 Rs more (household level) 
or around 37 percent (individual level) lower. This shows a strong and negative 
association between the adult income and child labor in the household. 
 
iii) Improvement in the head of the household's education (‘HH_HoH_Edu’) 
significantly decreases the probability of a child’s employment in the labor 
market. This is confirmed by the negative and significant estimates in the odds 
ratio of ‘at least primary education’ and ‘no education’ concerning the variable 
'head of the household's education' in both, the individual level and household 
level regressions. The estimated odds ratio for 'head of the household's education' 
are 0.457 in the family-wise regression and 0.605 in the child-wise regression. 
This means that the odds of child labor are about 54 percent and 39 percent lower 
for those households where the head of the household completed at least primary 
school compared with those households where the head of the household has no 
education. This shows a strong and negative association between the education 
status of the head of the household and child labor. 
 
iv) The age of the head of the household ('HH_HoH_Age_SC' Scaled head of the 
houshold's age in 5 years of age) shows a significant and positive effect on child 
labor supply in household level regressions. The use of children as a form of 
insurance (Pörtner, 2001) also provides some insight into the role of the ‘age of 
the head of the household’ in determining child labor. The idea behind this might 
be that the older the head of the household is, the more aware will he be of his 
dependency for livelihood in the future. Child laborers could be seen as an 
‘economic insurance’ in old age for the head of the household. Thus, the 
probability of a child to work is increasing with the age of the household head. 
The estimated odds ratio for 'age of the head of the household' are 1.240 in the 
family-wise regression and 1.071 in the child-wise regression, which means that 
the odds of child labor are 24 percent and 7 percent higher for each 5 years 
increase of the age of the household head. This shows a strong and positive 
association between the age of the head of the household and child labor.  
 
v) The sign of the coefficient for the size of a household ‘HH_Size’ shows that with 
an increase in the household size, the probability of child labour decreases in both, 
the individual level and household level regressions. This is contrary to what 
would have been expected, however, it might be explained by an increased 
number of adults - and not children - in the household. In fact, the more adults 
there are in the household, the less likely it is that a child works. The variable 
'total number of children' (‘HH_N_ChildLE14’) shows a statistically significant 
and positive relation with the occurrence of child labor. This indicates that the 
higher the number of children in a household, the more likely it is that some 
children of this family will go to work.  The estimated odds ratio for 'total number 
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of children' are 3.690 in the household level regression which means that the 
likelihood (odds) of a child to work increases by the factor 3.7 for each additional 
child in the household. This shows a strong and positive association between 'total 
number of children' in a family and child labor, which is described frequently in 
the literature (Patrinos, 1997).  
 
vi) In the household level and individual level regressions, there is a positive 
correlation between child employment and family debts ('HH_Debts_SC' scaled 
household’s debt in 5,000 Rupies). In both cases, the odds are increased by around 
10 to 15 percent (although not significantly at household level). That means that 
the odds of child employment are increased by around 10 to 15 percent if the debt 
burden of the household rises by each 5,000 Rupies.  
 
vii) This study neither finds a significant influence of absolute poverty 
('HH_IsAbsDolPov' household per capita income less than US$ 1per day) nor a 
significant influence of the 'gender of the head of the household' ('HH_HoH_Sex') 
on child labor supply of the household. Although the sample size is relatively high 
to gain a high power this result is likely to have been caused from the fact that 98 
percent of the households report that they live in absolute poverty (less than US$ 
1 income). In addition, most people generally underestimate their income if asked 
in a survey. Also 93 percent of the households are male-headed.  Thus, influences 
of the 'head of household's gender' or of absolute poverty on child labor supply 
might still be hard to detect. 
 
Results of testing whether and to which extent social labeling NGOs activities and 
other variables influence choices of child-activities between previous time and present 
(3.2.3) are presented in  Table 2D.  
 
i)  NGO assistance ('IsNGOAssist') had a significant positive impact on those who 
once were child laborers and are now going to school. The variable 'NGO 
assistance' is almost perfectly discriminating9 the outcome. Labeling NGOs have 
also a positive impact on those children who once were in school and still are. The 
estimated odds ratio is 54.9. This means, that the odds for a child of continuing 
school are on average 55 times higher for those children who are helped by 
labeling NGOs than those children who are not helped by labeling NGOs.  
 
ii)  The adult's income ('HH_IncGt14_SC' scaled adult's income in 5,000 Rupies) has 
a significant positive influence on child schooling, in other words adult income is 
negatively related with child drop out from school. The estimated odds ratio is 
                                                 
9 One can predict the sample outcomes perfectly by knowing the predictor values (except possibly at a boundary 
point). In such cases, an ML parameter estimate for logistic regression model is infinite. 
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4.6. This means that the odds of continuing school for a child are about 4.6 times 
higher per 5,000 Rupies. This finding again supports the luxury axiom (Basu and 
Van, 1998). 
 
iii)  The total number of children in a household ('HH_N_ChildLE14') has an impact 
on child activities between previous and present time. The result indicates that the 
higher the number of children in a household, (a) the more likely it is that  a 
previously idle child is still idle (odds are 2.4 times higher per one more child), 
(b) the less likely that a school going child would continue his/her school (odds 
are 79 percent smaller per one more child), and (c) the less likely that previously 
school going child is now working (odds are 72 percent smaller per one more 
child), because the child might be idle and finding no work. 
  
iv) The age of the head of the household ('HH_HoH_Age_SC' Scaled head of the 
houshold's age in 5 years of age) has played a significant positive role for those 
children who were previously idle and now working. The estimated odds of 
working for the idle children increase by 47 percent per 5 years of age of the head 
of the household. Also, the odds of the child drop out rate increase by 24 percent 
for those children who have a more aged head of the household than others.  
 
v) As the number of school going children in a household ('HH_N_Child0514-
School') increases, the likelihood of schooling for the ex child laborer increases. 
The estimated odds of school attendance for the ex child laborers are 23 times 
higher per one more school going child in the family. Also the previously idle 
child does not want to remain idle when the household has more school going 
children than a household with less school going children. The estimated odds of a 
previously idle child to be idle presently are 70 percent lower in the case where 
the more children are going to school in a household than the less. The drop out 
rate from school decreases by the increased number of school going child in a 
household. The odds of continuing schooling for a school going child are 22 times 
higher for the household where at least one more child is going to school. Odds 
for previously ‘schooling now working’ are 11 times higher per one more child 
going to school. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The empirical results support policies aimed at taking children out of paid employment 
and sending them to school. The trade-off between child employment and child schooling, as 
reflected in the negative and highly significant coefficient estimates of the corresponding 
variables, confirm that a child’s labor market participation as a wage laborer puts the biggest 
obstacle to her/ his school enrolment. 
 
This study finds that improvement in the child’s and household's welfare through the 
intervention of social labeling NGOs is an effective way of combating child labor and vis a vis 
increasing child schooling. One of the main factors which could influence the success of labeling 
NGOs is ‘monitoring frequency’10. However, this study does not consider ‘monitoring 
frequency’ as an explanatory variable because of the high collinearity with 
‘HH_IsAnybodyInLBLInd’ (Is anybody of the family is working in a labeled industry?) and 
‘Ind_NGOAssistChild’ (Is the child helped by labeling NGO?). In the household level analysis 
the most important factor is the number of the children under 14 years of age; a household with 
more children is much more likely to send a child to work than a household with less children. A 
combination of policies like labeling NGO’s welfare activities, birth spacing, access to the 
formal credit market, increase of the adult income, and adult education could be suggested from 
this study to remove a child from the ‘work place’ to ‘school’. 
                                                 
10 According to the ‘RUGMARK BULLETIN’ (2003), the frequency of the factory visits varies from once a week 
to once in two months, depending on the confidence of Rugmark in the factory’s commitment and performance with 
regard to the non use of child labor. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1A :  Number of Households in the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal, 2004 
  
District  Households Percent
Kathmandu 138 33.7
Lalitpur 128 31.2
Bhaktapur 144 35.1
Total 410 100.0
Source: Own survey. 
 
Table 1B :  Places of Interview  in the  Kathmandu Valley, Nepal, 2004 
 
 District Location 
 Kathmandu Bauddha 
 Kathmandu Bhungmati 
 Kathmandu Chabahil 
 Kathmandu Chuchepati 
 Kathmandu Jorpati 
 Kathmandu Kirtipur 
 Kathmandu Mahankal 
Kathmandu Swayambhu 
Kathmandu Koteshwor 
 Kathmandu Sallaghari 
 Lalitpur Bhaisepati 
 Lalitpur Ekantakuna 
 Lalitpur Nakhkhu 
Lalitpur Sanepa 
Lalitpur Jawalakhel 
 Lalitpur Sat Dobato 
 Bhaktapur Surya Binayak 
 Bhaktapur Sanothimi 
 Bhaktapur Jagati 
Bhaktapur Byasi 
 Bhaktapur Thimi 
Source: Own survey. 
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Table 1C : Labeling Status of Households 
 
  Households Percent
Labeling 229 55.9
Non Labeling 181 44.1
Total 410 100.0
Source: Own survey. 
 
 
Table 1D : Labeling Status of Household Members  
 
District 
Members of Labeling 
Households 
Members of Non Labeling 
Households 
Total Household 
Members 
 
Kathmandu 
 
307
48.5%
326
51.5%
633
100.0%
Lalitpur 
311
51.9%
288
48.1%
599
100.0%
Bhaktapur 
 
489
66.2%
250
33.8%
739
100.0%
Total 
  
1107
56.2%
864
43.8%
1971
100.0%
Source: Own survey. 
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Table 2D :  Multinomial logistic regression (3.2.3) results (Individual Level, N = 417) 
 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter  School-Work History Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 90%  Confidence Limits 
Intercept  previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-10.4411 0.9058
Intercept  previously idle and 
now child idle 
-15.1101 0.8804
Intercept  previously idle and 
now working 
-21.5699 0.9459
Intercept  previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-15.1866 0.9386
Intercept  previously schooling 
and now schooling 
1.9132 0.2120
IsNGOAssist Yes  vs No previously child labor 
and now schooling 
4.2638 <.0001 * 196.448
IsNGOAssist Yes  vs No previously idle and 
now child idle 
-5.7739 0.9187 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
IsNGOAssist Yes  vs No previously idle and 
now working 
-4.7824 0.9830 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
IsNGOAssist Yes  vs No previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-3.0979 0.9838 0.002 <0.001 >999.999
    * perfect discrimination; see Agresti, A. (1996), p. 134 for further discussion 
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Table 2D :  Multinomial logistic regression (3.2.3) results (Individual Level, N = 417) continued 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter  School-Work History Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 90%  Confidence Limits 
IsNGOAssist Yes  vs. No previously schooling 
and now schooling 
2.0027 0.0203 54.892 3.211 938.503
HH_IsAbsDolPov No previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-2.9823 0.9257 0.003 <0.001 >999.999
HH_IsAbsDolPov No previously idle and 
now child idle 
-4.6394 0.9554 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
HH_IsAbsDolPov No previously idle and 
now working 
-5.6496 0.9769 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
HH_IsAbsDolPov No previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-3.7035 0.9721 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
HH_IsAbsDolPov No previously schooling 
and now schooling 
-0.7220 0.2370 0.236 0.032 1.758
HH_HoH_Sex female previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-5.5360 0.9463 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
HH_HoH_Sex female previously idle and 
now child idle 
-0.1048 0.8588 0.811 0.117 5.631
HH_HoH_Sex female previously idle and 
now working 
-4.7278 0.9666 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
HH_HoH_Sex female previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-4.8909 0.9406 <0.001 <0.001 >999.999
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Table 2D :  Multinomial logistic regression (3.2.3) results (Individual Level, N = 417) continued 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter  School-Work History Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 90%  Confidence Limits 
HH_HoH_Sex female previously schooling 
and now schooling 
0.1413 0.5946 1.327 0.554 3.177 
HH_HoH_Educ at least 
primary 
education 
previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-0.3499 0.5564 0.497 0.070 3.516 
HH_HoH_Educ at least 
primary 
education 
previously idle and 
now child idle 
0.4541 0.0537 2.480 1.143 5.379 
HH_HoH_Educ at least 
primary 
education 
previously idle and 
now working 
0.2942 0.6433 1.801 0.223 14.560 
HH_HoH_Educ at least 
primary 
education 
previously schooling 
and now child labor 
0.0621 0.8957 1.132 0.238 5.381 
HH_HoH_Educ at least 
primary 
education 
previously schooling 
and now schooling 
0.1079 0.6036 1.241 0.626 2.458 
HH_IncGT14_SC(**)  previously child labor 
and now schooling 
1.1622 0.3765 3.197 0.368 27.766 
HH_IncGT14_SC(**)  previously idle and 
now child idle 
0.7316 0.2284 2.078 0.765 5.645 
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Table 2D :  Multinomial logistic regression (3.2.3) results (Individual Level, N = 417) continued 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter  School-Work History Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 90%  Confidence Limits 
HH_IncGT14_SC(**)  previously idle and 
now working 
1.8814 0.2842 6.563 0.365 118.068
HH_IncGT14_SC(**)  previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-0.8545 0.3639 0.426 0.090 2.001
HH_IncGT14_SC(**)  previously schooling 
and now schooling 
1.5224 0.0006 4.583 2.211 9.501
HH_N_ChildLE14  previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-1.2353 0.0855 0.291 0.089 0.948
HH_N_ChildLE14  previously idle and 
now child idle 
0.8597 0.0119 2.362 1.347 4.145
HH_N_ChildLE14  previously idle and 
now working 
1.7155 0.1178 5.559 0.915 33.762
HH_N_ChildLE14  previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-1.2793 0.0293 0.278 0.106 0.731
HH_N_ChildLE14  previously schooling 
and now schooling 
-1.5845 <.0001 0.205 0.126 0.334
HH_Debts_SC(***)  previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-0.8678 0.4649 0.420 0.060 2.960
HH_Debts_SC(***)  previously idle and 
now child idle 
0.1218 0.4956 1.130 0.842 1.516
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Table 2D :  Multinomial logistic regression (3.2.3) results (Individual Level, N = 417) continued 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameters School-Work History Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 90%  Confidence Limits 
HH_Debts_SC(***) previously idle and 
now working 
-1.1399 0.4656 0.320 0.024 4.179 
HH_Debts_SC(***) previously schooling 
and now child labor 
-1.8915 0.2116 0.151 0.012 1.821 
HH_Debts_SC(***) previously schooling 
and now schooling 
0.1447 0.2510 1.156 0.939 1.422 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(****) previously child labor 
and now schooling 
-0.1218 0.7288 0.885 0.497 1.578 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(****) previously idle and 
now child idle 
-0.0484 0.7479 0.953 0.744 1.221 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(****) previously idle and 
now working 
0.3833 0.0960 1.467 1.004 2.143 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(****) previously schooling 
and now child labor 
0.1640 0.3990 1.178 0.856 1.622 
HH_HoH_Age_SC(****) previously schooling 
and now schooling 
-0.2709 0.0168 0.763 0.633 0.919 
HH_N_Child0514School(*****) previously child labor 
and now schooling 
3.1271 <.0001 22.808 6.103 85.232 
HH_N_Child0514School(*****) previously idle and 
now child idle 
-1.2101 0.0009 0.298 0.164 0.543 
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Table 2D :  Multinomial logistic regression (3.2.3) results (Individual Level, N = 417) continued 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameters School-Work History Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate 
Point 90%  Confidence Limits 
HH_N_Child0514School(*****) previously idle and 
now working 
-0.9008 0.2911 0.406 0.100 1.653
HH_N_Child0514School(*****) previously schooling 
and now child labor 
2.3709 0.0008 10.707 3.365 34.071
HH_N_Child0514School(*****) previously schooling 
and now schooling 
3.0717 <.0001 21.578 12.629 36.868
HH_Size previously child labor 
and now schooling 
0.1609 0.6877 1.175 0.608 2.269
HH_Size previously idle and 
now child idle 
0.2480 0.3329 1.281 0.841 1.953
HH_Size previously idle and 
now working 
-0.9748 0.2405 0.377 0.096 1.479
HH_Size previously schooling 
and now child labor 
0.1632 0.5535 1.177 0.748 1.852
HH_Size previously schooling 
and now schooling 
0.0987 0.6011 1.104 0.809 1.506
 
(**)  HH_IncGt14_SC is the scaled adult income of the household (in 5,000 Rupies) 
(***) HH_Debts_SC is the scaled household's debts (in 5,000 Rupies) 
(****) HH_HoH_Age_SC is the scaled head of household's age (in 5 years) 
(*****) There is only 1 child in 148 households, so in order to test the robust ness of the variable ‘HH_N_Child0514School’ in the model 
we preclude the 148 households and run the regression in the same model, the variable ‘HH_N_Child0514School’ is significant 
and shows ‘spill over effect’ of schooling. 
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Multicollinearity 
 
To test for multicollinearity in multiple logistic regression the model was recalculated in an 
linear regression approach were multicollinearity-tests are available (Allison, 2003). 
 
No unacceptable values of multicollinearity - neither condition indices nor tolerance values - 
were detected. 
 
Condition indices and tolerance values are the two measures of multicollinearity commonly 
used. 
 
Condition indices are defined as the square roots of the ratios of the largest eigenvalue to each 
successive eigenvalue. If the condition index of a variable is “large” then the model contribution 
of that variable in terms of  "new" i.e. orthogonal information is small. 
 
Tolerance values are defined as the proportion of a variable's variance not accounted for by other 
independent variables in the equation. It is calculated as 1 minus R squared for an independent 
variable when it is predicted by the other independent variables already included in the analysis. 
Thus a variable with very low tolerance could contribute not much to the model in terms of 
variance reduction. 
 
Equivalent to tolerance values are variance inflation factors (VIFs) which are defined as the 
reciprocal of tolerance values. 
 
Although no formal criteria or tests are available - neither for condition indices nor for tolerance 
values – the following limits are commonly used: the condition indices should be below 10 
(week collinearity) and certainly below 100 (pronounced collinearity). Tolerance values should 
be larger than 0.25 (equivalent to: VIFs should be smaller than 4) (Garson, 2004). 
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